Originally posted on JHIBlog:

by guest contributor Luca Provenzano

Earlier, I discussed claims that the French philosopher Michel Foucault anticipated or deployed neoliberal dogmas about social security in an interview in 1983. I now consider Foucault’s assertions about health and healthcare in the same interview. I further assess how the allegations that he deployed “neoliberal dogmas” might relate to the contradictions of contemporary knowledge production.

In the 1983 interview, Foucault indeed proposed that “health” was not a right (cf. Zamora, Critiquer Foucault, 103). But not as a conclusion to “neoliberal” reasoning: the main argument was that it was obscurantist to “secure” by juridical right a state of biological and psychological fact. In other words, Foucault considered that a state as fragile as “health” could not be secured by legislation.

It is clear that there is hardly sense in speaking of a “right to health.” Health, good health, cannot come from a right…

View original 884 more words

Clare O'Farrell:

The comments quoted here appear at the end of a post from Barry Stocker’s blog reblogged earlier on Foucault News http://foucaultnews.com/2015/01/02/another-liberty-canon-foucault/

Originally posted on Notes On Liberty:

Jacques and Barry had an excellent back-and-forth on Barry’s post about Foucault’s contributions to liberty. Here is Dr Stocker’s final response to Dr Delacroix’s questions:

Well Jacques, my last comment was not supposed to be the full reply to your preceding comment, as I tried to make clear. As I said I needed time to think before posting anything from Foucault. I was just preparing the way with comments on the background to Foucault’s style. On Montaigne, how easy is Montaigne? Maybe he seems clear to you and other French people who read him in the Lycée. I teach a lot of Montaigne in Istanbul and students don’t find him easy. Maybe his style at a sentence by sentence level is clearer than Foucault, but I would say only Foucault at his most supposedly obscure. Montaigne can seem clear because he writes in a conversational way, appearing to just comment…

View original 1,306 more words

Séminaire « Avec Foucault 2015»
Responsable : Philippe Sabot

1ère séance de l’année 2015 : jeudi 29 janvier 2015, 16h30-18h30
Intervention de Philippe Sabot (STL / Lille 3) : « Archives »

Université Lille 3, Bât. B, salle de séminaire STL (B1. 663)

Seront proposés les premiers résultats d’un travail en cours sur les archives de Michel Foucault en dépôt à la BnF. Il sera question notamment du “Dossier préparatoire” aux Mots et les choses (le “fichier” de Foucault) mais aussi des méditations foucaldiennes sur le thème archéologique dans ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler son “Journal intellectuel”.

MOVIE REVIEW: ‘Blackhat’: Techno-thriller hacks into Michael Mann’s directorial signatures, By Peter Suderman — Special to The Washington Times – – Friday, January 16, 2015

The cinematic world of Michael Mann, the director behind “Heat,” “Collateral,” “The Insider” and “Miami Vice,” might look more or less like ours on the surface, but in fact it’s an alternate universe with unique rules and customs.

It’s a world in which the top three buttons of any men’s shirt are useless and designer sunglasses are always at hand. It’s a world of ultramodern architecture and eerie neon urban vistas, a world in which no human ever says “hello” or “goodbye” while on the telephone, and in which the most powerful form of communication between two individuals is the glower, the glance, the look that is at one mysterious and perfectly telling.


The alpha-hacker at the center of it all is Nicholas Hathaway (Chris Hemsworth), a convict with the legendary ability to penetrate practically any computer security system. When we first encounter him, he’s in prison, listening to high-end headphones and reading Foucault. He wears his hair long, in a lionlike blonde mane, and his biceps look like chiseled marble. He gets into trouble with the prison guards. Then he does some push-ups, just because.

Read more

Originally posted on Progressive Geographies:

Update 19Since the last update I’ve spent two long days working on the individual chapter files, checking and rechecking things, filling in references, and reorganising some things. In particular I reworked all the parts on the lettres de cachet. I’ve decided I need to re-read Le désordre des familles once more and might say more about it. It’s one of Foucault’s least-known works, but he worked on this topic, on and off, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. This book is hard to fit into the overall chronology because it spans so much time, and I’m not yet convinced with how I’m dealing with it. I’ll be taking a copy with me to Melbourne.

I now have a single file for the manuscript of this book. It’s not quite as good as I’d hoped to have at this stage, and there are still lots of things to do. The book is…

View original 388 more words

Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Conceptual genealogy for analytic philosophy – Part II.4: Foucault on archeology and genealogy, New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science, 13 January 2015

I am now back to working on my conceptual genealogy project; this post is the fifth installment of a series of posts on the project.  Part I is herePart II.1 is herePart II.2 is here; Part II.3 is here; a tentative abstract of 2 years ago, detailing the motivation for the project, is here.

In this section, I pitch genealogy against its close cousin archeology in order to argue that genealogy really is what is needed for the general project of historically informed analyses of philosophical concepts that I am articulating. And naturally, this leads me to Foucault. As always, comments welcome! (This is the first time in like 20 years that I do anything remotely serious with Foucault’s ideas: why did it take me so long? Lots of good stuff there.)


I hope to have argued more or less convincingly by now that, given the specific historicist conception of philosophical concepts I’ve just sketched, genealogy is a particularly suitable method for historically informed philosophical analysis. In the next section, a few specific examples will be provided. However, and as mentioned above, I take genealogy to be one among other such historical methods, so there are options. Why is genealogy a better option than the alternatives? In order to address this question, in this section I pitch genealogy against one of its main ‘competitors’ as a method for historical analysis: archeology. Naturally, this confrontation leads me directly to Foucault.

As is well known, early in his career Foucault developed and applied the archeological method in a number of works, which then received a more explicit methodological reflection in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969).

An “archaeology of knowledge” is an investigation that examines artifacts unearthed in an excavation, but the kind of artifact is not bone, pottery, or metalwork, it is what people said and wrote in the past: their “statements” (in French, énoncé: what has been enunciated or expressed). (Packer 2010, 345)


Read more

Animé par Jean-François Braunstein

Samedi 24 janvier
Philippe Sabot (Université Lille III)
Relire Les Mots et les choses à la lumière des archives

Samedi 24 janvier 2015, 10 h 30 – 12 h 30

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
UFR de philosophie
17 rue de la Sorbonne, Escalier C, 1er étage droite, salle Lalande
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
EA3562 PhiCo – Centre de philosophie contemporaine de la Sorbonne – EXeCO

Animé par Jean-François Braunstein
Programme 2014-2015

Samedi 24 janvier
Philippe Sabot (Université Lille III)
Relire Les Mots et les choses à la lumière des archives

Samedi 21 février
Jose Luis Moreno Pestaña (Université de Cadix)
Relire Le Pouvoir psychiatrique pour faire de la sociologie de la maladie mentale

Samedi 21 mars
Bernard Harcourt (Columbia Law School)
Le contre-positivisme critique de Foucault

Samedi 18 avril
Judith Revel (Université Paris-Ouest Nanterre)
Foucault avec Merleau-Ponty : une ontologie politique

Vendredi 22 mai – Samedi 23 mai
Journées d’études organisées par Ivan Moya Diez et Matteo Vagelli (Université Paris 1- Centre de philosophie contemporaine de la Sorbonne)
Epistémologie historique. Commencements et enjeux actuels

Les séances ont lieu de 10 h 30 à 12 h 30 à l’UFR de philosophie de la Sorbonne, escalier C, premier étage droite, salle Lalande.


Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 6,158 other followers

%d bloggers like this: